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In the Supre1ne Court
of the State of Utah

Robert S. Burton, Adininistrator
of the Estate of ADELINE G.
BURTON, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7854

ZIONS COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION, also known as
Z. C. M. I., a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees generally with the statement of facts by the appellant, except that it should be
pointed out that after the discharge of the prospective
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juror, Barker, the case proceded to trial before a jury,
duly sworn and regularly impaneled, and resulted in a
judgment on a verdict in favor of the respondent of no
cause of action ( R. 15).

STATEMENTS OF POINTS RELIED UPON
WHERE, AS HERE, THERE IS NO PROOF SHOWING
PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
BY THE TRIAL COURT, THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION
FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

ARGUMENT
Respondent has examined carefully the argument
advanced by appellant in support of his appeal and has
concluded that the entire argument is based upon unwarranted assumptions of fact and an inaccurate and
incorrect application of the principles of law involved
in this case.
Throughout appellant's brief it appears to be
assumed, as a proven fact, that the jury was influenced
by the statements made by the prospective juror, Barker,
and that the jury which was ultimately selected to try
the case must be presumed to have disregarded its oath
and to have decided the case under the influence of elements outside the evidence presented to the jury for
consideration. There is no support in the record for
such an assumption.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is submitted that this Court should not assurne
that the jury was prejudiced by any extrinsic matters
unless there is some showing or some fact presented
from which such prejudice may be inferred. To indulge
in such an assumption without a showing of prejudice
is, in effect, to nullify the regular and orderly proceedings utilized in the impaneling of a jury and to presume
that the jury was selected without the usual safeguards
employed by courts, and that after selection, the jury
wantonly disregarded the oath administered under the
provisions of Rule 47(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant asks this Court to indulge in this assumrption although, from the record, it is worth noting that
appellant did not object to the statements made by the
prospective juror, nor did appellant request that the
Court admonish the jury to pay no attention to such
statement. It is likewise worth noting that the jury,
having been finally impaneled, was passed for cause
by a;ppellant and no attempt was made to challenge any
juror for cause or to inquire of individual jurors whether
any of them possessed such a state of mind as would
prevent him from acting impartially and without pre. judice to the substantial rights of the appellant. The
appellant had such a right under the provisions of Rule
47 (f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and since
the record is ·silent, it must be presumed that appellant
did not avail himself of the opportunities afforded under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that rule. While the record is silent on this point, it is
a fact, as appellant knows, that the jury was passed for
cause without comment by a;ppellant.
On page 5 of appellant's brief the statement is
made that '' ... the conduct and argument of the prospective juror was calculated to and did influence the
verdict of the jury.'' On page 13, it is claimed that the
record seems to indicate that "he had more than a
passing interest in the case.'' Nowhere in the record
can there be found any basis for such bald assertions.
No claim was ever presented to the lower Court that
prospective juror Barker, designedly, or with '' calculation,'' made his remarks for the pur~ose of influencing
the jury in favor of the respondent. Nowhere can an
iota of proof be found to show that Barker knew anything about the case, or that he knew which insurance
company was involved, or that he had any connection
with the case. Appellant, having presented no proof
and having made no attempt to develop facts in search
of proof, now seeks to supply the elements which he
lacks by resort to sweeping assertions and thinly-veiled
innuendo. Appellant, by such argument, cannot escape
the fundamental rule of law that where "the possibility
of prejudice is not even vaguely discernible, it will not
be presumed.'' Redd vs. Airway Motor Oo(wh Lines, Inc.,
104 Utah 9, 137 Pacific 2nd 374.
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The only case brought to the attention of this Court
by the appellant as bearing on this question is the case

of Hudson, et al, Ys. Roos, 76 :Mich. 173, 42 N.W. 1099
(not 1049, as cited by appellant). That case is not even
remotely in point in this action. It was a case decided
in 1889 by the Supreme Court of Michigan, and the
principal point arose when counsel for plaintiffs, in
examining the jury, made a long speech in which he outlined thoroughly the full particulars of the plaintiffs'
claim and then, in the words of the court, ''took it upon
himself to give his version of the defense that would be
set up.'' Counsel commented upon every fact in the
case and \Yas able to do so with familiarity because of
the fact that the case had been tried once before. He
minimized the effect of defendant's claims and dwelt
at length upon the facts favorable to plaintiffs and upon
the virtues of plaitiffs' claims. In deciding the case, the
Court stated:
''By this practice the counsel for the plaintiffs
was enabled to get four arguments to the juryone before they were sworn and three afterwards, at least one more than he was entitled
to. This should not have been permitted by the
Court. The attention of the Circuit Judge was
called to it in the beginning, and his failure to
keep the counsel within bounds was prejudicial
error.''
It is submitted that the Hudson case and the referSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ences to annotations in A. L. R., as submitted by appellant, are not in point. The A. L. R. annotations are found
at 46 A. L. R. 1509, et seq., and 73 A. L. R. 89, and the
cases therein discussed are concerned either with
''chance'' verdicts or with misconduct of jurors after
they have been sworn and impaneled to try the case,
and usually the fact situations involved related to the
attempts by jurors to influence the verdict by bringing
personal experience to bear upon the facts of the case
which had been submitted to them. Thus, wherever the
practice of the Court allowed affidavits of jurors to impeach the verdict of the jury, the courts have held that
such conduct on the part of a sworn juror was an ohvious interference with the function of the jury in that it
brought new elements to bear upon the facts and evidence
which had been admitted in the case for their consideration.
In -contrast to this situation, however, is the case at
bar. Here the prospective juror admittedly knew nothing of the facts of this case, and his statements about
the fairness of insurance companies in dealing with
claims were nothing more than general comments of an
insurance salesman about the practices of insurance
-companies and could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be said to have rupplied to the facts of this case.
The jury might have received just such comments by
an examination of articles or advertisements in maga-

·i
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zines or newspapers, or by hearing or seeing advertisements on radio or television. To say that such information, whether received in court or out of court, would
effect the minds of a jury and cause them to violate
their oaths and to disregard the evidence submitted to
them in the case is to say that the oath of a man is worthless and that the orderly procedures of courts in the
administration of justice are a sham and a mockery.
"\Ve submit that since appellant has made no showing of any kind of prejudice resulting from the statements complained about, this court should not indulge
in the unwarranted assumption made by appellant that
prejudice was intended to result and did, in fact, result.
However, even if it be said, for the sake of argument, that the statements by Mr. Barker were prejudicial to appellant's case, the question of whether or not a
mistrial should have been granted necessarily is determined by the question of whether or not the Trial Court
abused its discretion. It has been the uniform rule that
in matters relating to the conduct of the trial, the
Trial Court has a wide discretion. It is usually referred
to by appellate courts as "the sound discretion" of
the Trial Court, and unless such discretion is clearly
abused, courts have always been reluctant to reverse
the ruling of an inferior court.
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There have been cases in Utah which presented
situations analogous, in legal :principle, to the case at
bar. Most of these cases have been concerned with the
problem of whether or not a new trial should have been
granted because of misconduct of a juror or because of
a claim of undue influence upon the jury. It is submitted, however, that the basic and guiding principles
of those cases are applicable to the case at bar.
In the case of Skeen vs. Skeen, 76 Utah 32, 287 Pacific 320~ a person not officially connected with the trial,
but who obviously was a close associate of plaintiff and
plaintiff's coun~el, n1ade derogatory remarks concerning the defendant, which remarks were claimed to have
been made in the presence of some members of the jury.
The remarks were such that, had they been believed,
they would have adversely affected the chances of the
defendant in the case inasmuch as they reflected upon
his integrity and character which were interwoven in
the issues presented to the court.
In affirming the trial court's refusal to grant a
new trial upon this ground, this Court said:
"The granting of a new trial upon this ground
is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court,
and it is generally held that a new trial will not
be granted because of remarks about the case in
the hearing of jurors by strangers to the litiga-

'"•,I,;
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tion where neither the successful party nor the
jurors '"ere at fault, unless such remarks probably influenced the verdict.''
In Callahan vs. Simons, 64 Utah 250, 2:28 Pacific
89:2, the question presented was whether or not a new
trial should have been granted by the lower court
because of prejudice which existed in the mind of a
juror against a class of tradesmen whose occupations
were similar to that of one of the parties, and which prejudice had not been made known by the juror during his
voir dire examination. This Court disposed of the question by stating:
"The question of whether a new trial should
be granted upon the ground of misconduct of a
juror or that he was prejudiced is a question
that largely rests in the sound legal discretion
of the Trial Court, and appellate courts cannot
interfere unless it is reasonably clear that the
Trial Court has abused its discretion in refusing
a new trial upon that ground." (Emphasis supplied.)
Other Utah· cases following this rule are Lund vs.
District Court, 90 Utah 433; 62 Pacific 2nd 278, and
Hepworth vs. Covey, 97 Utah 205; 91 Pacific 2nd 507.
The general rule which has been followed by courts
of most jurisdictions in the United States has been well
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated by the annotator in 86 A. L. R. 929, where it is
said:
''There are many cases where the misconduct
of the jury is sufficient to require an order of
mistrial, but the misconduct must be such as
reasonably to indicate that a fair and impartial
trial could not be had under the circumstances.
The better rule in such cases would seem to be
that such questions be left to the sound discretion of the Trial Court, whose decision should be
disturbed only in those cases where there has
been a plain abuse of discretion, resulting ~n
palp,able injustice." (Emphasis supplied.)
The reason for the rule is obvious. The Trial Court
is in a position to observe the demeanor of the jury and
to hear, at first hand, the statements which are alleged
to have prejudiced the jury. He sees the manner in which
the statements are made. He hears the inflection of
voice, and, while the statements are being made, his
attention is concentrated upon the other members of
the prospective jury, and he is thus able to determine
whether the statements appear to have any undue effect
upon the other members of the panel.
So it was in this case. The Trial Court, being well
aware that the question of insurance ordinarily should
not he injected into a trial, was cloing his best to cope
with a situation which had been brought about through
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the fault of neither party nor Judge. The Court was
aware that the injection of insurance into a case ordinarily reacts to the detriment of the defendant. He
was likewise aware that undue emphasis upon the remarks of :.Mr. Barker might cause the jury to take more
note of the ren1arks than would ordinarily be the case.
After hearing the matter carefully, and after hearing
comments from counsel in chambers, it was his opinion,
in the exercise of his sound legal discretion, that no harm
had been done and that the trial should proceed.
As will be remembered by counsel for the appellant,
the Trial Court, following his denial of the motion for a
mistrial, made the comment that it was difficult for him
to see how the remarks could have harmed one side of the
case more than the other. We believe that counsel for
appellant did not seriously believe that his cause had
been harmed because, as has been pointed out heretofore,
no request was made that the Court caution the jury
about Mr. Barker's statements, and no questions were
asked by counsel to determine whether or not the jury, as
ultimately sworn, considered itself impartially capable
of trying the case.
Appellant, in grasping for some semblance of proof
of prejudice in this case, urges that his argument is
supported by the fact that respondent made no objecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion to the statements by Barker. rrhis claim has no
more basis than appellant's other assertions.
Respondent did not object to the statements for the
reason that it was felt, in view of all the circumstances,
that any comment or objection would merely serve to
give emphasis to Barker's statements and perhaps cause
other members of the jury panel to give more attention
to the colloquy than was then apparent. It was our
belief then, as it is now, that no harm to either side resulted from Barker's statements.
Aside from legal principles, it appears to us that
the logic of the situation requires affirmance of the ruling of the Trial Court. If courts should be required to
grant a mistrial because of facts or arguments which are
·brought to the attention of the prospective members of a
jury panel before a jury trial, ·there is no apparent
place at which the line may be drawn. It would seem
that the same sort of argument as made by appellant
in this case could be made if members of the jury overheard similar statements in the corridor outside the
courtroom before beginning of the court session, and
if it could be then claimed that the statements heard in
the corridor were favorable to an insurance company
and that the legal and orderly proceedings of the trial
court could be then nullified, there would seem to be
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tittle purpvst• in the system of selection and iinpaneling

of juries as it is now employed.

CONCLUSION
Since appellant has made no showing in this Court
or in the Trial Court that the remarks of the prospective juror, Barker, were, in fact, prejudicial to the point
of impairing the integrity of the verdict of the jury, and
since there has been no attempt to show an abuse of the
Trial Court's discretion in this matter, the ruling of the
Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. SNOW
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW
Attorneys for Respondent
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